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 Unjust enrichment in Asia Pacific 
 (Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) 
 Man Yip * 
 CASES 
 1.  Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] SGCA 2; [2018] 1 
SLR 239 (Sing CA: S Menon CJ, A Phang JA and J Prakash JA); rvsg in part [2016] 
SGHC 281 (Sing HC: A Abdullah JC); [2018] RLR §1 
 Advance payment—failure of consideration 
 D held the Singapore master dealership rights for Lorinser cars, which were manufactured 
by Daimler AG. While P and D were negotiating an exclusive sub-dealership agreement 
for the Lorinser cars, P ordered a batch of cars with/through D and made an advance 
payment in respect of that order. The payment was made after P had received a copy 
of the draft agreement to be entered between D and Lorinser. It was intended that the 
exclusive sub-dealership agreement between P and D would be on substantially the same 
terms. The exclusive sub-dealership agreement was not ultimately concluded. P claimed 
for the recovery of the advance payment in unjust enrichment, on the basis of failure of 
consideration. The High Court allowed the claim. D appealed the decision. 
 Decision : The appeal was allowed in part. The unjust enrichment claim was unsuc-
cessful. (1) The advance payment was made not to show good faith and seriousness, but 
to avoid delay in the supply of cars which P ordered. On the evidence, Daimler AG would 
not commence manufacturing until the required deposit was paid, but neither Lorinser 
nor D was willing to put up the funds fi rst. Based on the evidence, P knew of the purpose 
for which the advance payment was made. (2) The implied basis of the payment was that 
D would offer P the exclusive sub-dealership agreement on terms which would materi-
ally correspond to the draft agreement between D and Lorinser. (3) The basis did not fail 
because it was P who refused to move forward with the exclusive sub-dealership agree-
ment as it did not agree to provide the required standby letter of credit. 
 Held : (1) The basis must be determined objectively based on the communications 
exchanged between the parties. Subjective thoughts of the parties which had not been 
communicated would be disregarded. (2) Implication of basis must be derived on objective 
features of the transfer and its context, as opposed to being based on merely a fortuitous 
overlap between the parties’ unexpressed expectations. 
 *  Associate Professor, Singapore Management University. I am immensely indebted to Associate Professor 
Rebecca Lee, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, for her assistance with the Hong Kong materials. 
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636 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
 Dicta : (1) There may be more than one basis to a transfer. (2) The possibility of accepting 
partial failure of consideration under Singapore law is not foreclosed. 
 2.  Grupo Pacifi ca Incorporada v Worldwide Marine Product Ltd [2018] HKCFI 1930; 
[2018] HKEC 2787 (HK CFI: Recorder Houghton SC) 
 Recovery of money paid pursuant to fraud—change of position defence—change of 
position made by third parties—ministerial receipt 
 P contracted to purchase a ship from a Korean seller. Both P and the seller acted through 
their agents. Full purchase price was made to the seller’s agent but the ship was not 
delivered to P. Pursuant to P’s demand for return of the purchase price, it received 
from the seller’s agent a bundle of documents which included a notice purportedly sent 
by P to the seller’s agent instructing the latter to pay over the money to D1 and D2 at 
their respective accounts with D3 and D4. A sum of US$449,963.60 was paid into D1’s 
account, and the transfer was not disputed by D1. P alleged that the signature on the 
notice was forged. P claimed in unjust enrichment against D1, alleging that the money 
was held for it by D1 on a constructive trust. 
 D1 argued that it was entitled to the defence of change of position and the defence of 
ministerial receipt. It said that it was an innocent recipient and that it had no knowledge 
of P or the alleged fraud. On D1’s account, it was running a seafood wholesale trading 
business for a PRC Company (T), and it facilitated T’s receipt of funds and settlement 
of payments with customers and suppliers in foreign currency. It said that T had agreed 
to a company (W)’s request to receive on its behalf a payment in US currency, to be paid 
to W in China in RMB and it was further agreed that the sum in US dollars would be 
remitted to D1’s account in Hong Kong. It was in these circumstances that D1 received 
US$449,963.60 into its account from the seller’s agent and this sum had been disbursed 
by way of three payments in China and one payment in Hong Kong the next day. 
The transaction was unusual as the four subsequent disbursements, on W’s instructions, 
were made to three individuals’ accounts. There was also a return of an overpayment 
to the seller’s agent, on W’s advice. The case was complicated by the uncertainty of 
which were the receiving and paying parties. The payments in China were transferred 
from accounts in the names of two employees of T. There was no payment into or out 
of T’s account. As a matter of book-keeping, the payments received in Hong Kong and 
the payments made in China balanced. D1 claimed that the disbursements in China were 
causally linked to the receipt of money into its own account in Hong Kong and that the 
accounts in the name of T’s employees were benefi cially owned by T. 
 Decision : P’s claim was allowed. D1 failed in establishing the defences put forward. 
(1) The change of position defence failed, as the relevant change of position was made 
by others and not D1. D1 could not simply adopt transactions made in China: D1, T and 
T’s employees are to be treated as separate legal entities. Common benefi cial ownership 
did not entitle T/D1 to disregard the corporate personality of T. It was not established that 
D1’s account was benefi cially owned by T. In any event, the alleged change of position 
could be easily reversed on the facts of the case, because the notional set-off between D1 
and T, as well as the transaction between T and W, could be readily reversed. Further, D1 
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 UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN ASIA PACIFIC 637
had not acted in good faith, as it had not acted in a commercially acceptable manner. D1 
chose to act as a money exchange service in respect of a substantial amount of money 
without carrying out any form of due diligence investigation as to why it was asked to 
provide such a service, the source of the funds, or the underlying basis of the transaction. 
(2) The ministerial receipt defence failed because D1 failed to plead as well as establish on 
the evidence that it was an agent for another or that it had an obligation to account. In any 
event, the defence would not be available as the illegitimate transaction could have been 
reversed and the supposed obligation to account avoided. 
 Held : (1) For the change of position to succeed, the relevant change of position must 
be made by the defendant, and not third parties. Adoption of transactions involving 
others (and not the defendant) by the defendant is generally not permissible. (2) Common 
benefi cial ownership in the accounts does not entitle the benefi cial owner to disregard 
the separate corporate personality of the company. (3) To show lack of good faith in 
respect of the operation of the defence of change of position, it is suffi cient to show 
that the defendant has failed to act in a commercially acceptable way ( Niru Battery 
Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1446;  [2004] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 344 ; [2004] QB 985 followed). (4) The defence of ministerial receipt may be 
established on showing the defendant has acted as an agent for another and to whom he 
has an obligation to account. 
 Comment : Although the Hong Kong court acknowledged that P needed to show that 
D1’s enrichment at its expense was  unjust , there was no discussion as to what was the 
applicable unjust factor. 
 3.  Lim Kim Huat v Datuk Johari Abdul Ghani and Azlan Bin Ahmad; Pauline Soo Wei 
Ling (third party) [2018] 1 LNS 1360 (Mal HC: F Jamaludin JC) 
 Misapplication of corporate assets—absence of basis 
 P and a company (“the Company”) entered into a trust arrangement that the Company would 
hold its interests in various properties (purchased from DBKL) on trust for P. Following a 
sale and purchase agreement entered into between the shareholders of the Company and 
D1, D1 caused the shares of the Company to be transferred to him and D2 and they were 
both appointed as directors of the Company. Shortly after one of the two shareholders 
of the Company passed away, D1 and D2 gained full control over the Company and 
thereafter assigned and novated the Company’s rights and interests in the properties to 
another company (I). D1 and D2 then proceeded to cause the Company to transfer all 
its shares to a corporate entity (J) owned by D1 and his wife. Through his shareholding 
in J, after the share transfer, D1 received the benefi t of the proceeds of the assignment/
novation, which comprised a novation fee and an amount equivalent to the 10% deposit 
which the Company had paid to DBKL for the purchase of properties. Further, D1 and D2 
dishonestly caused the amount which D1 had paid for the Company’s shares to be stated 
as a sum that was owed to a company director in the Company’s audited accounts, which 
resulted in the same sum being paid out by the Company to D1. Subsequent to the transfer 
of all the shares in the Company to J, D1 and D2 caused the Company to be struck off 
the companies register. P brought various claims against D1 and D2, including a claim in 
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638 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
unjust enrichment and a claim for knowingly procuring/inducing a breach of duties on the 
part of the Company. 
 Decision : (1) D1 was liable for having been unjustly enriched at P’s expense; but the 
claim against D2 failed. There was an absence of basis for D1 to receive the proceeds of 
the assignment and novation of the properties. (2) Both D1 and D2 were found liable for 
knowingly induced, procured and/or caused the Company to breach its trust and fi duciary 
duties to P. Following the Privy Council decision in  Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn v Tan 
[1995] 3 MLJ 74; [1995] 2 AC 378, D1 and D2 were constructive trustees for P of the 
proceeds of the assignment and novation of the Company’s interests in the properties. 
 Held : (1) Malaysian law applies the “absence of basis” approach, instead of the unjust 
factors approach under English law, following the Federal Court’s decision in  Dream 
Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453. (2) It is settled law that, if 
a fi duciary, in breach of his/her fi duciary duty, obtains a benefi t for himself/herself at the 
expense of the benefi ciary, it is a case of unjust enrichment. In this regard, the law does not 
distinguish between a fi duciary who is dishonest and one who is not. 
 4.  Novaviro Technology Sdn Bhd v QL Plantation Sdn Bhd; Watermech Engineering 
Sdn Bhd (third party) [2018] 7 CLJ 119 (Mal HC: Wong KK JC) 
 Limitation period—Limitation Act 1953, s.6(6) 
 P entered into a joint venture arrangement with a third-party company and shared 
confi dential information regarding a system to which P held an exclusive licence (the 
“System”). However, the joint venture was terminated. P subsequently submitted a proposal 
to D to design, build and commission a power plant which D wished to build based on 
the System. D also received a proposal from a third party which it accepted as it was a 
lower bid than P’s proposal. P claimed that the third party was in breach of confi dence, 
having misused confi dential information which P shared with it previously whilst the joint 
venture arrangement was on foot. P sued D for having been unjustly enriched by reason 
of their misuse of the confi dential information belonging to P when the power plant was 
launched into operation. D applied to strike out the claim, alleging, amongst other issues, 
that the unjust enrichment claim was time barred. 
 The Limitation Act 1953, s.6(6) provides: 
 “ Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions 
 6(1) Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 
six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say: 
 … 
 6(6) Subject to the provisions of section 22 and 32 of this Act the provisions of this section 
shall apply (if necessary by analogy) to all claims for specifi c performance of a contract and for an 
injunction or for other equitable relief whether the same be founded upon any contract or tort or 
upon any trust or other ground in equity.” 
 Decision : The claim in unjust enrichment was time barred under the Limitation Act 
1953, s.6(6). The cause of action accrued on 30 April 2010, when the defendant retained 
the benefi t of the confi dential information, that is, when they fi rst used the confi dential 
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 UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN ASIA PACIFIC 639
information in the construction of the power plant. The action was thus time barred on 
1 May 2016. 
 Held : (1) A cause of action in unjust enrichment is a claim for “equitable relief” under 
the Limitation Act 1953, s.6(6). A six-year limitation period applies to unjust enrichment 
claims. (2) A cause of action in unjust enrichment accrued when a defendant retained 
the enrichment. Despite the differences in wording between the Limitation Act 1953, 
s.6(6) and the Limitation Act 1980 (UK), English cases ( Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets 
Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 1681;  Michael Agapios Diamandis v Sir David Seton Wills [2015] 
EWHC 312) on when a cause of action for unjust enrichment accrues are followed. This 
is because the Malaysian Federal Court in  Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn 
Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453 has followed English cases in recognising a cause of action in 
unjust enrichment. 
 5.  Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui (trading as VIE Import & Export) [2018] 
SGCA 5; [2018] 1 SLR 363 (Sing CA: S Menon CJ, A Phang JA, J Prakash JA, Tay 
YK JA and S Chong JA); affg [2017] SGHC 56; [2018] 3 SLR 617 (Sing HC: A Lim JC) 
 Illegality—reliance principle—stultifi cation— locus poenitentiae  principle 
 The dispute arose from a series of agreements between P and D that were on the face of the 
documents concerned with P investing in D’s business, through the provision of “loans”. 
These “loans”, according to the agreements, were to be repaid at a later specifi ed date with 
a “profi t”. The agreements were supported by tax invoices issued by D stating the kind, 
quantity and price of goods to which they related. P and D conceded that the agreements 
were not “entirely proper” and that the tax invoices were fabricated documents which did 
not relate to genuine transactions performed by D. P claimed against D on a number of 
bases, including contract and, alternatively, in unjust enrichment. The High Court found 
that the agreements were unenforceable for being in contravention of the Moneylenders 
Act (Cap 188, 1985 Rev Edn), as the agreements were in substance loan agreements and 
P were unlicensed moneylenders. The High Court also dismissed P’s claim in unjust 
enrichment. P appealed. 
 Decision : The appeal was dismissed. (1) The Court of Appeal, agreeing with the High 
Court, found that the agreements were unenforceable for being in contravention of the 
Moneylenders Act. (2) The elements of the unjust enrichment were established. The 
applicable unjust factor was failure of consideration. (3) However, the unjust enrichment 
was barred by the principle of stultifi cation. This is because allowing the recovery of the 
principal sums transferred under the illegal contracts would undermine the fundamental 
social and public policy against unlicensed moneylending which undergirds the 
Moneylenders Act. 
 Held : (1) The “range of factors” approach in  Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42;  [2016] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 300 ; [2017] AC 467 was not followed, as it would introduce unprincipled 
discretion and uncertainty and is unnecessary to achieve remedial justice. (2) In respect of 
contractual illegality, a two-stage approach would apply. Under the fi rst stage, the issue is 
whether the contract is prohibited. Where the contract is prohibited by statute (expressly or 
impliedly) or is found to be illegal at common law, benefi ts transferred under the contract 
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640 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
cannot be recovered in contract law. At the second stage, the issue is whether a non-
contractual claim to recover the benefi ts transferred under the contract is an independent 
claim, that is, it does not substantively rely on the underlying contractual illegality. (3) The 
formal/technical application of the reliance principle in  Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 
was rejected. (4) Whether an unjust enrichment claim is defeated by the illegality defence 
is to be determined based on the stultifi cation principle. The question is whether allowing 
the claim in unjust enrichment would undermine the fundamental policy of rendering 
the underlying contract void and unenforceable. (5) The  Ochroid approach confi nes the 
exercise of discretion to stage one and only in relation to the category of contracts that are 
illegal at common law. 
 Obiter : (1) In relation to an independent proprietary claim in tort law or in the law of 
the trusts, if the technical reliance approach in  Tinsley v Milligan is not to be followed, the 
court may bar the independent proprietary claim by applying the principle of stultifi cation. 
(2) In relation to the “not  in pari delicto ” principle, it would apply to situations such 
as class protection statutes; fraud, duress or oppression; and where the transaction was 
entered into as a result of mistake. The stultifi cation principle would be inapplicable in 
situations where the “not  in pari delicto ” principle applies, as awarding restitution to a 
less blameworthy plaintiff would not undermine the fundamental policy of the law. In 
some cases, awarding restitution may in fact further the fundamental policy of the law. 
(3) In applying the “not  in pari delicto ” principle, the court does not engage in a broad 
examination of the relative blameworthiness of each party. (4) In relation to the  locus 
poenitentiae exception, a narrow account of the exception that is rooted in moral merit 
is favoured—as such, withdrawal must be penitent or voluntary. Such an application 
would be consistent with the policy of encouraging people to withdraw from their illegal 
activities. Moreover, it is only in such situations that an award of restitution would not 
confl ict with the stultifi cation principle. 
 Comment : (1) In cases where the underlying illegality does not relate to contract, it 
appears that the outcome would depend solely on the application of the principle of 
stultifi cation. (2) It remains to be seen whether Singapore law will develop a uniform 
approach to illegality in private law. Although the court does not give a fi rm indication that 
it would depart from the technical reliance rule in the proprietary context, there appears to 
be no good reason why the rule should be abolished in the contractual context but retained 
in the other contexts. 
 6.  Tin Wan Tung v Wong See Yin [2018] HKCFI 1143; [2018] HKEC 1333 (HK CFI: W 
Chan J) 
 Transfer of real property pursuant to fraudulent misrepresentations—failure of 
consideration — proprietary restitution 
 D1 had represented to Ps that he would set up an asset management company which would 
be listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange and that this asset management company would 
in turn help Ps to obtain fi nancing for their construction projects in the PRC and Hong 
Kong. D1 told Ps that they could invest in the asset management company by injecting 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 2
2/
03
/2
02
0 
06
:2
7
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN ASIA PACIFIC 641
their real properties into the company, while retaining a right to live in these properties 
free of rent. Pursuant to these misrepresentations, Ps transferred two real properties to 
companies (D3) owned and controlled by D1, without having received any consideration. 
D1 was also the director of D3. D1 used the two properties as security to obtain mortgage 
loans from a bank. Under pressure from D1, Ps also signed a tenancy agreement in respect 
of each property on the understanding that these agreements were required for complying 
with accounting requirements in order that D1 and D3 could more easily obtain fi nance 
for the construction projects. However, D3 later claimed to be the owner of the properties 
and demanded rent from Ps. Ps brought a number of claims against D1 and D3, including 
a claim in unjust enrichment, alleging that D1 and D3 had been unjustly enriched by the 
receipt of the two properties. 
 Decision : Ps’ unjust enrichment claim was allowed. The properties were thus held on a 
resulting trust for Ps. (1) D1’s representations to Ps were fraudulently made. (2) As such, 
the consideration for Ps’ transfer of properties to D3 had failed totally. 
 Held : (1) “Consideration” in the context of an unjust enrichment claim refers to the 
anticipated performance for which the benefi t was transferred from the plaintiff to the 
defendant ( Shanghai Tongji Science & Technology Industrial Co Ltd v Casil Clearing 
Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 79 followed). (2) Where total failure of consideration is relied 
upon as the unjust factor for the claim, the transaction which provides the basis for 
the defendant’s enrichment must be correctly identifi ed and characterised in order 
that the relevant anticipated performance and its failure may be determined. (3) In the 
law of unjust enrichment, the usual consideration which fails is the promised counter-
performance. 
 Obiter : There are three advantages of proprietary restitutionary claims. First, they may 
lie against an innocent recipient of the property, even if no other personal claims could 
be brought against him/her. Second, in the event of the recipient’s insolvency, subject to 
statutory requirements in certain cases, the true owner may claim the property  in specie . 
Third, the true owner may trace his assets into interest bearing investments and claim the 
interest in addition. 
 7.  Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] SGCA 44; [2018] 2 SLR 
655 (Sing CA: S Menon CJ, A Phang JA, J Prakash JA, Tay YK JA and S Chong JA); 
noted Fee [2019] LMCLQ 500; Lau [2019] LMCLQ 508; Yip and See (2019) 135 LQR 36 
 Wrotham Park damages—restitutionary or compensatory in nature 
 P and D were involved in a joint venture project to develop land that was subject to a 
state lease granted to D. Under the project, D would grant subleases to the joint venture 
companies, which would in turn let the premises out for income. A shareholder dispute 
subsequently arose between the parties while the site was being developed, but this was 
eventually settled. The parties’ settlement agreement was recorded in a consent order and 
it provided for a bidding process, pursuant to which the higher bidder would buy over the 
lower bidder’s shares. The parties behind the lower bid would also resign as directors. 
The point of this process was to facilitate a clean break between the parties. However, 
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before the bidding exercise took place, the defendants, on obtaining a renewal of the state 
lease, refused to grant corresponding subleases to the joint venture companies as they 
previously did. This development led to a substantial diminution of the companies’ share 
value, thereby frustrating the bidding exercise. 
 P brought a number of claims against D, including a claim for breach of contract. In 
an earlier Court of Appeal decision ( Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua 
[2017] 2 SLR 12), it was found that D had committed repudiatory breach of contract. 
The second appeal thus focused on, amongst other issues, the question of what remedy 
should be awarded for the contractual breaches. The parties focused on the nature and 
applicability of an award of  Wrotham Park damages (named after  Wrotham Park Estate 
Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798), as well as a disgorgement award, as 
they were in agreement that it would be diffi cult to quantify the fi nancial loss caused by 
the contractual breaches. 
 Decision : An award of  Wrotham Park damages was denied. P was not able to show that 
there was a remedial lacuna in the case to justify an award of  Wrotham Park damages; 
further, the hypothetical bargain, the measure of the  Wrotham Park damages, would defeat 
the very purpose of the parties’ settlement. On the evidence, the Court was satisfi ed that 
P had suffered some form of fi nancial loss as a result of the frustration of the bidding 
process. P had lost business profi ts less the purchase price of the lower bidder’s shares 
if they had emerged as the higher bidder; if they were the lower bidder, they had lost a 
reasonable price for their shares. Orthodox compensatory damages were thus awarded, 
assessed by reference to the value of the plaintiffs’ shares prior to the breach with the 
addition of a 15% premium to refl ect their expectation loss. 
 Held : (1) A compensatory account of  Wrotham Park damages was affi rmed. An award 
of  Wrotham Park damages measures the plaintiff’s compensation by reference to the 
defendant’s gain but the rationale of the award is not based on the goals of punishment 
and deterrence. The goal of punishment is generally inconsistent with the law of contract. 
A  Wrotham Park award is ordered to compensate for the loss of the performance interest. 
(2) A restitutionary account of  Wrotham Park damages was rejected. (3) An award of 
 Wrotham Park damages must be distinguished from an award of disgorgement of profi ts 
for breach of contract (see  A-G v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268). (3) To be entitled to an award 
of  Wrotham Park damages for breach of contract, three requirements must be satisfi ed. 
First,  Wrotham Park damages would be ordered only if there is a “remedial lacuna”—that 
is, where the plaintiff has suffered no fi nancial loss for which orthodox compensation may 
be awarded and specifi c relief is unavailable on the facts of the case. Second, as a general 
rule, a breach of negative covenant must be established. Third, the hypothetical bargain, on 
which the award is measured, must not be one that is irrational or unrealistic for parties to 
make. (4) Declined to follow the approach laid down by the UK Supreme Court in  Morris-
Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20;  [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495 ; [2018] 2 
WLR 1353. The English limiting criterion of requiring that the breach of contract result in 
a loss of an economically valuable asset created or protected by that contractual right was 
considered to be too uncertain. 
 Obiter : (1) The chief diffi culty with recognising  A-G v Blake damages as part of 
Singapore law is the uncertain legal criteria relating to their availability. The concept 
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 UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN ASIA PACIFIC 643
of “legitimate interest” is too general and perhaps even vague. (2) It may be possible 
to rationalise  A-G v Blake damages as an exceptional remedy and confi ned to cases 
where the law has a legitimate basis—upholding public interest/governmental interest 
that goes beyond the private interests—for punishing the defendant and/or deterring 
the non-performance of the contractual obligation. Alternatively,  A-G v Blake may be 
reinterpreted as a case of awarding an account of profi ts for breaching an obligation akin 
to a fi duciary duty. 
 ARTICLES 
 8. Leow, R, “Enforcing Unjust Enrichment Rights: The Recovery of Mistaken 
Payments in Practice” [2018] Sing JLS 22. 
 It is well established under Singapore law that a mistaken payor may recover his/her 
mistaken payment by bringing a claim in unjust enrichment. However, the enforcement 
of the mistaken payor’s rights in practice is not as straightforward, owing to privacy laws 
in the banking sector. The article considers the recoverability of mistaken payments made 
by bank transfer in practice in Singapore and argues for a simpler and cheaper way for 
mistaken payors to enforce their unjust enrichment rights. In essence, to improve access 
to justice, the article argues for expanding the Small Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
encompass such claims. 
 9. Loh, JKH, “Disgorgement Damages for Breach of Contracts: Something New?” 
[2017] 1 Legal Network Series (A) lxxi. 
 This article analyses the disgorgement awards against the wider remedial framework 
under contract law. Although such awards appear at fi rst sight to be inconsistent with 
the goals of contractual remedies, the article argues that the notion of contractual 
performance shows that the disgorgement award is consistent with corrective justice. It 
argues that disgorgement damages for breach of contract are also consistent with the goal 
of vindicating a plaintiff’s right to contractual performance. It follows that such awards 
encourage performance of contracts at a broader societal level and are therefore consistent 
with the principles of corrective justice. 
 10. Rotherham, C, “Morally Blameless Wrongdoers and the Change of Position 
Defence” (2018) 30 Sing Acad LJ 149. 
 This article argues that morally blameless defendants who have committed strict liability 
torts should be allowed to raise the defence of change of position against plaintiffs who 
are claiming for  Wrotham Park damages (named after  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v 
Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798). In order for this argument to prevail, the article 
acknowledges that such damages must be characterised as gain-based in nature, as 
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opposed to being compensatory (which is the currently favoured account by Singapore 
and English courts). The article further qualifi es its proposal by limiting the availability 
of the defence to defendants who have changed their circumstances, whether carelessly 
or not, in such a way that they derived no net enrichment by reason of their wrong. 
According to the article, defendants who have altered their circumstances by dissipating 
wealth for their own benefi t should not be allowed to invoke the defence if they had 
acted carelessly. This marks a distinction in the application of the change of position 
defence in the context of restitution for wrongs from its application in the context of 
subtractive unjust enrichment. 
 OTHER 
 11. Loke, A (Professor, City University of Hong Kong School of Law), “Disagreement 
over the Illegality Defence in Private Law Claims: Contrasting Approaches and 
Shifting Values” 
 HKU-SMU Asian Private Law Workshop 2018 , 17–18 May 2018, Singapore Management 
University School of Law 
 The rationalisation of the analytical framework for the illegality defence in private law 
is always bound to be controversial. The majority decision of the UK Supreme Court 
in  Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42;  [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 300 ; [2017] AC 467 sought to 
replace the longstanding rule-based approach to illegality with a more fl exible “range-
of-factors” approach. Such a radical root-and-branch rethinking of how one should 
approach the illegality defence in private law claims up-ends the traditional approach 
and implicates the bounds of the judicial function. In January 2018, the Singapore Court 
of Appeal in  Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui ( ante , § 5) unequivocally repudiated 
 Patel v Mirza . The Singapore approach seeks to prune the unsatisfactory reliance 
principle by reconceptualising it. While it signals a radical return to the roots of the 
repentance principle, it also embraces the approach advocated by Birks, that an analysis 
of illegality in unjust enrichment claims should be underpinned by the stultifi cation 
principle. This paper compares the UK and Singapore approaches and considers the 
claims of certainty as well as the controversy over “judicial discretion” in dealing with 
public policy concerns. It discusses the limits to the certainty that the stultifi cation 
principle or an analytical framework can provide, and proposes that, at its core, a fair 
and discerning application of the illegality defence necessarily involves the resolution 
of public policy concerns which can pull in different directions. 
